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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

ARCHIE BECKSTROM and
ELIZABETH BECKSTROM,
Plaintiff'S and Respondents,

vs.

ARTHUR LIVINGSTON and
DIANTHA LIVINGSTON,
Defendants and Appellants.

CASE
NO. 8646

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents cannot agree with the facts as stated by
appellants in their brief.
Respondents contend that after some negotiation the
property involved in this litig,ation was sold to respondents for the sum of $16,200.00. Appellants gave a receipt
which listed the property sold to respondents (Emibit D19) for $2,000.00 down payment upon the pu~chase price
of the property. 'r.he receipt was signed by Arthur Liv-
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ingston and started in part the "total consideration for the
above property to :be $16,200.00" (T. 93, 94, 135). Respondent testified the purchase price was $16,200.00 and
that the receipt was typed by Mr. Livingston's relative at
Livingston's Electric Shop, in Spanish Fork, and signed
by Mr. Livingston. Respondent itemized the various items
whlch totaled $16,200.00 (T. 174, 175) and there was independent testimony by Dr. Merrill Lee Oldroyd (T. 152)
that sale price to Beckstrom would be around $16,000.00.
The interest rate on the unpaid balance was in dispute but
Beckstrom contends that it was 4% per annum from the
date of the oral contract of November 30, 1947, until the
June 1, 1949 written contract (T. 178). Beckstrom paid
$6,300.00 on the oral contract by June 1, 1949, when Arthur Livingston and he got together in Spanish Fork and
adjusted all aceotmts between them and taking into occount over $700.00 owed by appellant and arrived at a
figure of $10,000.00 then owed by respondent to appellant.
On that same day they went to the law office of J. Rulon
Morgan in Provo and he drew a contract for $10,000.00,
which was executed by plaintiffs and defendants June 1,
1949 (Exhibit P-1, T. 5, 26, 84 179, 180). Subsequently
respondent made payments in cash to appellants of $9,481.25, stipulated as having been paid by both parties at
the trial (T. 7). Respondents also contend, and the court
so found, that they should receive credit for $714.16 from
the sale of wool from sheep bought from Don Clyde and
George Jackson (T. 8-16, 183, 184). In addition, the respondents should be credited with amounts paid on appellants' ta..xes. Respondents contend that after taking into
account all the payments and credits they are entitled to,
they owed on March 1, 1952, the sum of $1,381.14, and
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that they should be credited with the amounrt of the wool
sale of $714.16, leaving a balance of $666.98 owed Mareh
1, 1952. Interest on $666.98 at the contract rate, 4¥2%
per annum, from March 1, 1952, to October 15, 1953, the
date of respondent's tender (E:x!hibit !D-4) was $48.79, making $715.77 owed as of that date. The court charged the
respondents with payments made by appellants in behalf
of respondents after that date in the amonnt of $186.50,
making a balance due the appellants of $902.27.
Both the '47 and '49 contracts provided for the transfer of a grazing permit for 900 head o.f sheep to the buyer
(EX!hibits P-1 and D-19). The supporting commensurate
property for this grazing privilege consisted of certain land
Mr. Livingston owned in Sanpete County as well as the
land which was subject to this contract (T. 180). It is
undisputed that a grazing permit for 700 head has been
transferred to respondents, 200 head short of what the appellants agreed to deliver. Although requested on several
occasions, appellants have refused to sign a Bureau of Land
Management waiver in favor of respondents, transferring
a 135 head grazing permit still being used by Living~ton,
in order to make up part of what appellant has failed to
deliver. This 135 head still retained by appellant was part
of the 900 head permit which was to be transferred torespondent (T. 180-181).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND RESPONDENT OWED APPELLANT $10,000.00 ON JUNE
1, 1949.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

POINT II
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA WAS NOT
USED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT III
THE SUM OF $186.50 ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL
COURT TO APPELLANTS FOR TAXES, GRAZING
FEES, AND WATER ASSESSMENTS HE PAID WAS

ADEQUATE.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
APPELLANTS SOLD WOOL AND RECEIVED $714.16

THEREFOR AND AGREED RESPONDENTS SHOULD
HAVE CREDIT ON THE CONTRACf IN THE AMOUNT
OF $714.16.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT CORR.ECfLY FOUND THE
BALANCE OWED ON THE CONTRACT AS OF MARCH
1, 1952 AS $1381.14 AND CORRECTLY FOUND THE

RESPONDENT HAD TENIDERED FULL PERFORMANCE AND CORRECfLY DECREED SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT AND CORRECfLY
ALLOWED RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND CORRECTLY THAT
APPELLANT SHOULD CONVEY 135 HEAD GRAZING
.
PERMIT TO THE RESPONDENTS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY roUND RESPONDENT OWED APPELLANT $10,000.00 ON JUNE
1, 1949.
The conduct of the parties indicates this. They signed

a contract for $10,000.00 unpaid balance prepared by attorney J. Rulon Morgan at the request of both (T. 5, Exhibit P-1). Respondent testified he met appellant in Spanish Fork on the 1st day of June, 1949, and iborth went to
the Bank of Spanish Fork and figured up what was owed
to appellant. 'Ilhey tJhen went to Provo to Mr. Morgan's
office and he drew the contract, which was executed (T.
42, 178, 184).
The trial court wenrt back of the written contract of
1949 and permitted testimony of the dealings of the parties
prior to that time. Respondent testified the original con-.
tract sale price was $16,200.00 (T. 39, 42, 174, 175) and
he was able to itemize the items of property in the sale
(T. 38, 39). He testilied the inrterest was at 4% per annum
on the unpaid balance (T. 22, 84). Although appellant contended the interest was at 5% during this period, in some
testimony he said (T. 119) that it was at 4% per annum.
Further substantiating the daim that ·the original1947
contract price was $16,200.00 is the receipt given by appellant to respondent on the day of the oral conrtra:ct, November 30, 1947, (Exhibit 1D. 19), which was signed by
Livingston and whioh says, "Total consideration for the
above property to be $16,200.00" and lists the property sold
(T. 135).
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Further ;substantiating this claim is the testimony of
Dr. Merrill Lee Oldroyd. He said he had conversaJtion with
Arthur Livingston in the fall of 1947 about purchase of the
property involved, and said Livingston told him the price
would be about $16,000.00 (T. 152, 153).
In fact, respondent paid $6,300.00 in cash on the '47
contract between November 30, 1947, and June 1, 1949
(T. 194). This is undisputed. In addition he was entitled
to certain credirts on the 1947 contract because of money
appellant owed him. These credits are listed as follows:
For hauling Livingston's sheep in June, 1947
(T. 24-25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $200.00
For herding 338 head of Livingston's sheep
from the desert in the fall of 1947 for 60
days (T. 26-27) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
236.60
For care of 21 head of Livingston's sheep at
home for 60 days @ $2.00 per head (T.
42, Deposition of Beckstrom, page 12)..
42.00
For feeding 7 bucks for 60 days............
17.50
Livingston's share of desert well expense (T.
34) ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
344.00
TOTAL. . . . . . . .

$840.10

Less amount owed Livingston for lambs on
November 30, 1947 (T. 76, 201) . . . . . . . .

NEr . . . . . . . . .

100.00
$740.10

Thus, it will be seen that not only did the parties agree
that $10,000.00 was owed as of June 1, 1949, as is shoWn
by the contract of that date, but the testimony of respondent shows thart he should be allowed a credit of $740.10 on
the day of the 1947 contract. When the $6,300.00 is a:p-
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plied to this contract on the days the sums were paid- (T.
194) a simple mathematical calculation shows that slightly
less than $10,000.00 was owed by respondent to appellant
on June 1, 1949.
Appellant attempts to explain the $16,200.00 sale price
shown in the receipt (Exhibit n ..19) by contending that he
allowed respondent a $1600.00 credit for supposed unsettled
accounts, the $1,600.00 ·and $16,200.00 making $17,600.00.
Only appellant's unsupported testimony substantiates tlhis.
He attempts to bolster his testimony by making reference
rto notations he allegedly made at the time of the execution
of the 1947 oral contract (EX!hihit D-13). On voir dire
examination iJt is clear that the piece of paper on which the
notes were made was not read by respondent, and certainly
he can not be rbound rby the self-serving notations of appellant (T. 96-97). This is poor evidence, indeed, when
compared to the receipt given by appellant to respondent
at the same time (Exhibit D-19) signed "Arthur Livingston". Respondent testified he never heard of any credit
for $1,600.00 until the lawsuit came up, when the same
was referred to in the depositions (T. 177) .
Reference is made by appellant to a meeting in the
office of J. Rulon Morgan in 1953 by the parties involved.
It is clear that this meeting was an attempt to ~bitrate
and negotiate a settlement of the dispute (T. 194, 195).
Certainly, merely because the plaintiff, Beckstrom, did not
remember every single item which should have been to his
credit in November 30, 1947, when he met in Mr. Morgan's
office in 1953, is not evidence that the parties' minds did
not meet in the -contract concluded June 1, 1949. It is
clear that the additional Uem of $200.00 for hauling sheep
was not recalled by respondent at Mr. Morgan's office. As
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to the claim in appellant's brief on page 7 that this was a
'~baseless charge" by reason of the so-called "independent
witness" Lucero, Lucero testified he didn't know whether
Mr. Beckstrom hauled any sheep in the spring under question. He said, "I don't know, I drove the herd" in answer
to a direct question as to whether he knew whether Beckstrom hauled any other sheep up (T. 87-88}.
In summary, the parties decided that $10,000.00 was
tbe correct amount owed appellant by respondent on June
1, 1949, When they signed a contract to that effect Ex-P1
and there was ample evidence at the trial to support what
the parties did.
POINT II
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA WAS NOT
USED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In reply to Point II, the trial court did not decide the
issue set forth in Point II on the basis of an accord and
satisfaction, as is shown by the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
POINT III
THE SUM OF $186.50 ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL
COURT TO APPELLANTS FOR TAXES, GRAZING
FEES, AND WATER ASSESSMENTS HE PAID WAS
ADEQUATE.
Of the items on page 3 of appellant's brief totaling
$499.94, the second and last item in the amounts of $48.17
and $100.48 are improperly charged to the respondent. The
second item is for general taxes on land sold for 1955. The
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uncontradicted testimony of respondent is that he paid
these taxes before appellant paid them, and that he paid
them on the last day (T. 61, 62). Appellant may be able
to recover $48.17 from the Utah County Treasurer for
double payment of these taxes, but ought not to claim credit
against respondent when the taxes were paid by him on
time. As to the item for $100.48, it will be noted in the
computations set forth in Point V herein that the trial
court did not credit this $100.48 in the contract computa~
tion to arrive at a contract balance of $1,381.14 as of March
1, 1952.
Set off against these charges are three payments made
by Livingston to Beckstrom paid in 1948 and 1949, totaling
$427.31. Two of the checks, one for November 30, 1948,
in the amounrt of $126.66, and one for November 2, 1949,
in the amount of $113.50 (T. 51, 52, 53, 61) were identified
by respondent. These checks were offered in evidence by
attorney for appellant (T. 58) and were received as Emibits
D-7 and D-8. In addition to these two checks, paid to appellant by respondent, it was stipuated by the parties that
taxes in the amount of $187.50 were pad by respondent for
1948 taxes, which included an $87.02 tax payment on appellants' home tax. Thus, if anything, the trial court erred
in favor of appellant raJther than against appellant on this
point. In fairness to the trial court, it should be pointed
out that at the time of final argument of the cause attorney
for appellant submitted a compurtation on this point to the
court which showed the following:
Paid by Livingston 1949 through 1955 ..... .
Credit by check, Beckstrom ............. .

$526.79
340.29

Due Livingston ......................... .

$186.50
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT CO'RRECTLY HELD THAT
APPELLANTS SOLD WOOL AND RECEIVED $714.16
THEREFOR AND AGREED RESPONDENTS SHOULD
HAVE CREDIT ON THE CONTRACf IN THE AMOUNT
OF $714.16.
Respondent's uncontradicted testimony is that he advanced a:ppellant $9f75.00 November 27, 1950, and $640.00
December 1, 1950, totaling $1,615.00 (T. 9, 64), which appellant used to pay for 97 head of sheep bought from Don
Clyde and George Jackson (T. 8, 9, 103). It is also undisputed that respondent took possession of these sheep and
fed and cared for them for appellant during the winter of
1950-1951 (T. 9, 10, 11). Respondent refused to nm the
sheep for appellant during the summer of 1951, although
asked to do so by appellant, and when told fuis, appellant
said he did not have any place to put them. The parties
discussed the cost of the feed and care of the sheep (T. 10,
11). After appellant said he couldn't get enough to pay
for the sheep and for the care and feed respondent had
inrto the sheep, the parties agreed respondent would take
the sheep and credit for the sale of the wool from the sheep
for what was paid for them, $1615.00, in cancellation of
the bill owed respondent by appellant for feed and care
(T. 14, 15). In this connection respondent testified that
he fed the sheep from December 10, 1950, to May 1, 1951,
art a total cost of $1,641.25 (T. 79, 80, 81).
As further evidence Exhibit P-2 shows a credit for
$526.24 on accrued contract interest given respondent by
appellant and signed by appeHant, the sum to be taken
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from money received by appellant from sale of the wool
in question (T. 7, 8).
Appellant has a different versioo of this transaotiOIL
Apparemly he wants to take all the proceeds from the sale
of the wool from the sheep when the sheep were paid for
by respondent and fed and cared for by respondent even
though appellant has absolutely nothing invested in the
sheep, either in feed, care, or money. If appellant wanted
the wool money, he should have paid for rtilie sheep by crediting respondent witJh $1,615.00 on the contract, should have
paid for the winter care and feed, and should have taken
possession of the sheep in the spring of 1951-nooe of which
he did or has offered to do.
As to the slight confliet between $712.00 claimed by
appellant as the price received for the wool, and $714.16
allowed by the court, the court apparently assumed something over 700 lbs. of wool, (T. 68) and that the p~
had stipulated to $714.16 (T. 14).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE
BALANCE OWED ON THE CONTRACT AS OF MARCH
1, 1952 AS $1381.14 AND CORRECTLY FOUND THE
RESPONDENT HAD TENDERED FULL PERFORMANCE AND CORRECTLY DECREED SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT AND CORRECTLY
ALLOWED RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS.
Following is a schedule of payments and interest computations made on the 1949 written contract by respondent
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to appellant excluding therefrom a check for $187.50 made
November 28, 1949, which was for taxes:
$10,000.00
141.45

Interest to Sept. 23, 1949

$10,141.45 Principal & Interest due Sept. 23, 1949
300.00 Payment Sept. 23, 1949
$ 9,841.45
30.25

Balance due Sept. 23, 1949
Interest to Oct. 18, 1949

$ 9,871. 70 Principal & Interest due Oct. 18, 1949
293.75 Payment Oct. 18, 1949
$ 9,577.95
99.68

Balance due Oct. 18, 1949
Interest to Jan. 15, 1950

$ 9,677.63
2,000.00

Principal & Interest to Jan. 15, 1950
Payment Jan. 15, 1950

$ 7,677.63 Balance due Jan. 15, 1950
24.44 ll1lterest to Feb. 10, 1950
$ 7,702..07
200.00

Principal & Interest to Feb. 10, 1950

Payment Feb. 10, 1950

$ 7,502.07 Balance due Feb. 10, 1950
153.64 Interest to July 27, 1950
$ 7,655.71 Principal & Interest to July 27, 1950
1,000.00 Payment July 27, 1950
$ 6,655.71
18.04

Balance due July 27, 1950
Interest to Aug. 18, 1950

$ 6,673.75

Principal and Interest to Aug. 18, 1950
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500.00 Payment Aug. 18, 1950
$ 6,173. 75
14.44

Balance due Arug. 18, 1950
Inter.est to Sept. 6, 1950

$ 6,188.19 Principal & Interest to Sept. 6, 1950
2,000.00 Payment Sept. 6, 1950
$ 4,188.19
6.63

Balance due Sept. 6, 1950
Interest to Sept. 19, 1950

$ 4,194.82
750.00

Principal & Interest to Sept. 19, 1950
Payment Sept. 19, 1950

$ 3,444.82 Balance due Sept. 19, 1950
11.76 Interest to Oct. 17, 1950
$ 3,456.58
100.00

Principal & Interest to Oct. 17, 1950
Payraent Oct. 17, 1950

$ 3,356.58 Balance due Oct. 17, 1950
8.61 Interest to Nov. 7, 1950
$ 3,365.19
500.00

Principal & Interest to Nov. 7, 1950
Payment Nov. 7, 1950

$ 2,865.19 Balance due Nov. 7, 1950
132.08 Interest to Nov. 16, 1951
$ 2,997.27 Principal & Interest to Nov. 16, 1951
150.00 Payment Nov. 16, 1951
$ 2,847.27
19.95

Balance due Nov. 16, 1951
Interest to Jan. 12, 1952

$ 2,867.22

Principal & Interest to Jan. 12, 1952
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500.00 Payment Jan. 11 & 12, 1952
$ 2,367.22 Balance due Jan. 12, 1952
13.92 Interest to March 1, 1952
$ 2,381.14 Principal & Interest to March 1, 1952
1,000.00 Payment March 1, 1952.
$ 1,381.14 Balance due March 1, 1952 at last payment
on Contract.
The above payments as to amount and time were stipulated to by the parties (T. 7). The court then deducted
$714.16 credit for the wool, leaving a balance owing as of
October 15, 1953, the day of the tender, of $666.98. The
cotWt then added to this figure $48.79, being interest on
$666.98 for 19¥2 months at the contract rate of 4¥2 %, making $715.77 owed as of rthe date of the tender. The trial
court then added 1he credirts allowed the appellant in the
amOWlt of $186.50 to arrive at a balance due of $902.27.
The court held the tender made by respondent to appellant
sufficient (Exhibit D-4). It will be readily seen that during virtually all the period from June 1, 1949, to March 1,
1952, respondent was well ahead of his contract payment
requirements. As of March 1, 1952, appellant was entitled
to credit for $351.29, being what appellant claims on page
3 of his brief less $48.17 for 1955 taxes double paid by appellant, and less $100.48 not credited to respondents' acoount by tJhe above schedule of payments. In 1948 and
1949, however, respondent repaid appellant on account of
these taxes and grazing payments $427.31 less $100.48, or
$326.83, (Point III herein). Thus we see that at the most
appeHant was owed $24.46 on that date on account of taxes,
etc., prepaid by him.
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To refuse specific performance to respondent would be
a grave injustice. The attention of the oourt is directed
to the forfeiture clause in the contract of 1949 (E~hibit
P-1) which provides a 30 day grace period. Certainly it
would be the most gross injustice art this point for respondent not to get the land he has paid or offered to pay for,
in the face of substantial increases in the value of land,
grazing privileges and sheep, when full tender was made
within the grace period. Certainly rthe Utah case cited by
appellant at page 18, Roberts vs. Braffertt, 33 Uta:h 51, is
not authority for this harsh rule. In that case the buyer
had only paid $100.00 of a total purchase price of $250.00,
and there was a long history of attempt by the seller to
get the buyer to pay the balance. In the instant case the
buyer paid or tendered payment of all sums requked by
the contract within the time permitted by the contract.
Cedrtainly acceptance by the buyer of thousands of dollars
after any money for taxes, ertc., was owing the seller would
amount to a waiver of his right to daim forfeiture or recession. King vs. Hintze, 2 Utah 2nd 166, 270 Pac. 2nd
1095, 1096. Even if it be conceded that the respondent did
owe the appellant a few dollars on March 1st, 1952, by reason of tax and grazing payments made by appellant, the
tender of respondent made Ootober 15, 1953, was more than
sufficient to repay the sums owed. As a matter of fact
the court found that after October 15, 1953, the appellant
became entitled to the credit of $186.50. If the appellant
had accepted the tender when offered all sums due them
would have been more than paid. Failure to pay taxes or
assessments precisely on time certainly would not go to the
essence of the ·contract and would not constitute a substantial breach, especially where the amount is so small
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when compared with the total purchase price. Certainly,
aJt the very least, performance of the respondent would be
sulbstantial performance, breach, if any, being minor, and
such should be sufficient. 12 American Jur. Section 343,
Restatement of Contracts Section 375.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND CORRECrLY THAT
APPELLANT SHOULD CONVEY 135 HEAD GRAZING
PERMIT TO THE RESPONDENTS.
This question resolves itself into whether the respondent 'bought a permit for 900 head of sheep at $2.50 per head
or whether he bought just what the Bureau of Land Management decided the ground he bought from appellant
would carry as commensurate land.

It is undisputed that both parties considered a permit
of 900 head was bought and sold (T. 92-93. Exhibit P-1,
Exhibit D-19) and at $2.50 per head (T. 37, 38, 95, 175).
The appellants now want to renege on this agreement to
deliver 900 head, even though they can deliver a grazing
permirt for an add~tional 135 head (T. 180). Respondent
testified the Bureau of Land Management furnished him
with a waiver form to have Mr. Livingston sign for this
purpose "and I asked Mr. Livingston to sign that and Mr.
Williams, his assistant, gave me a waiver and asked me to
sign it, because we knew all the time that Arthur's ground
in Sanpete was part of the commensurate on that 900 head"
(T. 180). Respondent further testified that the permit commensurate to the Sanpete property of appellant would be
transferred to land he owned other than that bought from
appellant (T. 180). There is no testimony in the record
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showing appellant was ever billed for 900 head on the Dugway unit and for an additional 135 head on the Dugway
unit in the same year. It is clear that there were only 900
units on the Dugway permit, and that this 135 head presently eommensurate to Sanpete prope1'1:y is part of this 900
head unit.
It is significant that although appellant took the stand
as a rebuttal witness (T. 202-203) he never contradicted
the testimony of respondent that the 135 head permit commensurate to Sanpete ground was actually a part of the
original 900 head Dugway unit. In this connection, reference is made to a letter from J. Kent Giles, range manager
of the Bonneville Grazing District, dated April 25, 1956,
and addressed to "Whom It May Concern," whieh shows
that the cut on appellants' base property to be 65 head,
leaving 835 head-700 on the Beckstrom land and 135 head
commensurate to Sanpete land. This letter was filed with
the trial court by agreement orf ·counsel.
Even if the trial court be sustained on this point, respondent will still receive a 65 head smaller permit than he
contracted to buy and the appellant contracted to sell. If
anything, the trial court should order the appellant to pay
damages for failure to deliver the additional 65 head. The
uncontradicted testimony af the respondent is that appellant
refused on several occasions to transfer that portion of the
900 unit permit not based upon the lands sold to respondent in order that the same could become commensurate to
other land owned by respondent (T. 179-180).
Failure to deliver a 200 head grazing permit worth
$500.00 on the day of November 30, 1947 oral contract
(T. 19, 37, 38, 92, 93) and worth $2,000.00 at the time of
trial (T. 20) is hardly "substantial compliance" as claimed
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by appellant. The appellants' theory that all respondent
bought was whatever the government chose to give is baseless. The parties themselves did not so provide in either the
oral contract of November 30, 1947, or in the written rontract: of June 1, 1949.
CONCLUSION

Respondent stands ready to perform in accordance with
the decree of the trial court. It is only just that this decree
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD M. TAYLOR
.Aittorney fur Respondents
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